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Overview
This article is a study of the “Ellis defence”. It is also the story of John Ellis’ 
struggle against the Catholic Church. As a child, John Ellis was the victim of 
a priest’s sexual abuse. As will be seen, the difficulty John Ellis encountered in 
Ellis1 in suing any person or body apart from the offending priest (who died), 
arose from the application of orthodox legal principles to the particular struc-
ture of the Catholic Church. The legal issue in Ellis arose because the Catholic 
Church, like other Christian denominations, is an unincorporated association 
with a fluctuating membership. John Ellis could not establish tort liability 
against an unincorporated association. He also could not engage the rules for 
the appointment of a representative to be sued on behalf of that unincorporated 
association. The applicable property trust that held the assets of the Catholic 
Church had no liability because it had not held management responsibility for 
the offending priest. The Archbishop of the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese had 
no responsibility for any negligence of his predecessors.
Despite its legal orthodoxy, Ellis had profound implications. A key theoreti-
cal implication of this essay is that the Ellis defence may disincentivise churches 
from prohibiting paedophilia. The defence may also lead to tacit toleration 
of children’s abuse. The doctrine therefore has great significance for law and 
religion in Australia.
The article highlights the implications of Ellis for victims of child sexual 
abuse from three viewpoints. First, the perspective of the victim, John Ellis, who 
sought to engage with the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese under the Towards Healing 
protocol before he commenced pretrial litigation. Secondly, the findings of the 
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (“Royal 
Commission”), which carried out a Case Study into Ellis’ experiences, including 
his litigation with the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese. The Royal Commission’s 
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findings and conclusions provide sharp historic insights into the background to 
Ellis that only came to light as a result of its careful and detailed work. Thirdly, 
the role of George Cardinal Pell in the administration of Towards Healing in the 
Sydney Catholic Archdiocese and his involvement in the Archdiocese’s decision 
making during the Ellis litigation. The article analyses a recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria (VSC)—JCB v Bird2—concerning a victim’s claim 
for damages arising from paedophilia in the Catholic Diocese of Ballarat. In 
JCB v Bird, the VSC analysed legislation enacted by the Victorian legislature 
in response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission arising from 
Ellis. In the concluding section, the author offers some opinions about the 
political response to Ellis; the implications of Ellis for victims of church sexual 
abuse; and the prospects for victims of historic child sexual abuse in the light 
of legislative reforms.
There are four other introductory points to make, briefly, about this essay. 
First, the “author voice” in this article is not neutral: I cannot write entirely dis-
passionately about injustice for a victim of child sexual abuse. The second point 
is related to the first. From to time, I am critical of Pell, the man in charge of the 
Sydney Catholic Archdiocese at the time Ellis lodged his Towards Healing claim 
and during the entirety of the Ellis litigation. Thirdly, I hope that my high respect 
for John Ellis is evident from the article. His ordeal with the Sydney Catholic 
Archdiocese became a blueprint for how institutions responsible for caring for 
children should not engage with them as sexual assault victims. Without Ellis’ 
tenacity, there would be no such negative blueprint. Fourthly, the article uses 
some graphic terms and the content may distress some readers.
The background to the Ellis Towards Healing claim
In 2002, John Ellis, a then 41-year-old law firm partner at Baker & McKenzie, 
made a complaint to the Catholic Church in Sydney (“Sydney Catholic 
Archdiocese”) under its Towards Healing protocol for grievances about sexual 
abuse. Ellis’ submission related to sexual assaults committed upon him by an 
Assistant Priest, Father Aidan Duggan. Duggan’s abuse of Ellis began in the 
1970s when Ellis was a teenage altar boy at Christ the King Catholic Church, 
Bass Hill (part of the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese). The assaults perpetrated 
against Ellis included masturbation, oral sex, and anal penetration.3
A Benedictine priest ordained in Sydney in 1950, Duggan spent four years 
at New Norcia in Western Australia; in Catholic terminology, New Norcia 
was an Abbey Nullius, ungoverned.4 The Sydney Catholic Archdiocese could 
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later produce no records of Duggan’s time at New Norcia.5 After four years at 
New Norcia, Duggan travelled to Scotland where he lived for 20 years. There, 
he serially abused boys at Fort Augustus Abbey School as well as at its feeder 
school Carlekemp Priory School.6 His brother, Father Fabian Duggan, was also 
at Carlekemp and, like his brother Aidan, was involved in sexual abuse.7 Fabian 
Duggan died on the same day that BBC Scotland raised allegations of sexual 
assault against him in relation to his time at Carlekemp.8
Duggan initially returned to Australia to the Hobart Catholic Archdiocese 
before he arrived six months later, in late 1974, at Christ the King, on secondment 
from Fort Augustus.9 At Bass Hill, Duggan, then in his 50s, set about grooming 
the 13-year-old altar boy John Ellis, who would later recall the sensation of the 
soreness of his face from Duggan’s beard stubble after Duggan kissed him.10 Ellis 
was a teenager with a bright future. He had been dux of his primary school. He 
would come first in the State in Geology in his Higher School Certificate and, 
later, after initially considering the priesthood, he would achieve first in the state 
in the Nurses Registration Board examination. In law, he would come in the 
top ten in his year at the University of Sydney, achieving First Class Honours.11
The initial assaults began when Ellis was 14 and continued until he was 17. 
They occurred in the Bass Hill presbytery and at a holiday house. As Duggan 
later moved ghostlike between parishes (he held six appointments in Sydney 
between 1974 and 1995),12 he maintained contact with Ellis. Duggan continued 
to have sexual contact with Ellis: in a presbytery at Gymea; and, several times, 
in Duggan’s upstairs bedroom in the presbytery at St Mary’s Cathedral. Later, 
Duggan had sexual relations with Ellis in a presbytery at Camperdown next to 
the University of Sydney where Ellis was, by then, studying law and could visit 
between his lectures. The two men had sex in 1987 after Ellis visited Duggan 
to arrange for Duggan to baptise Ellis’ first child. Duggan had officiated at Ellis’ 
wedding and later conducted the girl’s baptism. Ellis’ last recollection of having 
any sexual contact with Duggan was when Ellis was 2613 and Duggan was in 
his late 60s. It was not, then, until 1996 or 1997, after the breakdown of his first 
marriage, that Ellis (then in his mid-30s), when preparing to facilitate a session 
for divorcees, appreciated that what had occurred with Duggan was abuse.14
The Ellis litigation
George Pell become Archbishop of the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese in 2001. 
He would be made a Cardinal in 2003. Before taking his seat in Sydney, Pell 
had served as Archbishop of the Melbourne Catholic Archdiocese. He was 
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the architect of the Melbourne Response, a program for dealing with allega-
tions of sexual abuse in the Melbourne Catholic Archdiocese, a program that 
Pell describes as a “world first”.15 Pell claims to have managed 300 complain-
ants under the Melbourne Response.16 Pell launched the Melbourne Response 
in October 1996, a month before the Catholic Bishops Conference approved 
Towards Healing.17 This timing meant that the Melbourne Response gazumped 
Towards Healing in Melbourne. As Pell acknowledged to the Royal Commission, 
the effect of his introducing the Melbourne Response when he did, meant that 
Towards Healing (which came into effect in March 1997), and which, unlike 
the Melbourne Response, allowed victims to receive uncapped damages, was 
not a national response.18 Behind the impressive administrative visage of the 
Melbourne Response there was a miserly compensation scheme. Between 1996 
and 2014, the average compensation payment to a victim of sexual abuse under 
the Melbourne Response was a mere $32,000.19
Pell knew about managing Church victims’ claims. Pell was also well 
equipped, as a researcher of the history of the early Roman Church, to under-
stand the susceptibilities of the relatively powerless to forms of control by men 
with divine authority. During his doctoral candidacy at the University of Oxford 
in the late 1960s, Pell had researched the concept of a monarchical episcopate, 
in which a bishop dominates presbyters in teaching and matters of judgment.20 
Monarchs are difficult to move from office. Pell concluded from these studies 
that, emboldened by confidence in apostolic succession, it was a small step 
for the Roman bishops of the early church to move from a view of superiority 
over presbyters, to actual belief in inheritance of Peter’s position (i.e., the Peter 
to whom Christ had given a special position).21 In short, Bishops could be 
susceptible to the allure of monarch-like clerical power. It was, and is, a small 
step to conceive of some priests, by reason of their ordained position, having 
a mindset of superiority over the laity, particularly the young. This research in 
the formative stages of his clerical career provided Pell with original insights 
into power relations in the church and specifically to understanding the skewed 
power between the most impressionable of its members—children—and priests, 
with ordained, immutable, authority.
There was, however, little apparent sympathy in Pell’s correspondence 
with Ellis, or during the litigation that followed. Ellis’ Towards Healing claim 
was a plea for help. He wanted the Church to assist him with the spiritual and 
emotional dilemmas he was facing and to appoint someone to help him.22 There 
was a reflexive hostility in the Archdiocese’s responses. The Sydney Catholic 
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Archdiocese responded to Ellis by telling him that Duggan had no capacity to 
understand the allegations against him and that Duggan could not respond to 
them23 because he had dementia.24 The subtext to this limbic response was that 
the problems were Duggan’s, not those of the Church. Pell himself told Ellis 
on Christmas Eve in 2002 that, in the “circumstances I do not see that there 
is anything the Archdiocese can do” to reach resolution.25 The implication of 
this correspondence was that Pell viewed the notion that the Sydney Catholic 
Archdiocese would facilitate any kind of reconciliation with Ellis as pointless. 
The correspondence demonstrated Archbishop Pell’s direct involvement in the 
Ellis matter from an early stage.
There were historic hints that Ellis may find it difficult to engage with the 
Sydney Catholic Archdiocese under Archbishop Pell’s administration. Pell’s show 
of support for Father Gerald Ridsdale in the 1990s might have, if Ellis had known 
about it, caused Ellis to wonder how strongly the recently appointed Sydney 
Catholic Archbishop would support a 1970s’ victim of Catholic Church paedo-
philia. In 1993, Pell walked beside the soon-to-be convicted paedophile priest, 
Gerald Ridsdale, when Ridsdale appeared before the Melbourne Magistrates 
Court to plead guilty to 30 charges of sexual offences.26 In 1973, Pell had lived 
with Gerald Ridsdale for ten months in East Ballarat, without, according to Pell, 
the two men forming a close friendship.27 The Royal Commission concluded 
that, in 1973 (the year he lived with Ridsdale), Pell had considered whether it 
was prudent for Ridsdale to take boys on overnight camping trips, due to the 
possibility of Ridsdale sexually abusing them.28 In 1993, Pell accompanied that 
same man to the Melbourne Magistrates Court in an act that Pell described as 
“priestly solidarity.”29 Pell, then an Auxiliary Bishop, said at the time of the sen-
tencing that Ridsdale had made “terrible mistakes.”30 This phrase, which would 
be replayed to Pell,31 reflected a priest’s perspective. A victim of rape, child or 
adult, is not the victim of a “mistake”. Pell later acknowledged to a Parliamentary 
Inquiry that he had not understood at the time that his public demonstration 
of support for Ridsdale at the Melbourne Magistrates Court would translate to 
a perceived hostility by him towards victims.32 His failure to understand this 
hostility, was, Pell said, because he had “always been on the side of victims.”33 
Yet, in 2016, Pell told the Royal Commission that he took little interest in what 
Catholic clergy in Ballarat knew about the paedophile activities of Ridsdale in 
Ballarat in 1975. Specifically, Pell told the Royal Commission in 2016, to gasps 
from the live-broadcast audience listening to his testimony, that Pell didn’t know 
whether Ridsdale’s offending in Inglewood in the Ballarat Diocese in 1975 was 
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common knowledge at the time, and that the matter was “a sad story, of not 
much interest” to him.34 In a striking contrast, Ridsdale described himself to 
the Royal Commission as being “out of control” during his time at Inglewood.35 
Ridsdale lived alone in a presbytery and had a pool table that he described as 
a trap for young boys.36 The review of JCB v Bird discussed later in this article 
includes a more detailed analysis of Ridsdale’s crimes and the practices of 
Ballarat Diocese’s Bishops in relation to him.
Pell claims to have “loyally implemented” Towards Healing in the Sydney 
Archdiocese,37 but in Ellis’ case, as Pell acknowledged, the Catholic Church’s 
management of Towards Healing was “flawed”.38 Ellis, as a result, engaged with 
Towards Healing, powered by his own tenacity. Through Ellis’ persistence, and 
despite numerous failings in the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese’s management of 
its processes for reviewing complaints under Towards Healing, Ellis progressed 
the matter to assessment. He sought compensation of $100,000. In May 2004, 
the Church offered Ellis a settlement figure of $25,000, which, in June 2004, 
was increased to $30,000.39 Ellis rejected these compensation offers and, with 
his customary determination, in July 2004,40 he sought a review of the handling 
of his Towards Healing complaint. The respected former New South Wales 
Ombudsman, Mr David Landa, investigated the Church’s handling of the 
matter.41 The results of Landa’s findings were clear: the Church, Landa reported, 
“fail[ed] to observe the required process.”42 Echoing Landa’s findings, the Royal 
Commission concluded that the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese “fundamentally 
failed”43 in its conduct of the Towards Healing process Ellis and it noted “an 
absence of justice for Mr Ellis through the extensive delays in undertaking the 
required process.”44
On 30 August 2004, with Ellis by then having exhausted all avenues under 
Towards Healing and with the statutory limitation period for commencing 
legal proceedings having long since expired, Ellis filed a Statement of Claim 
in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (‘NSWSC’). Patten AJ would hear 
the matter. Ellis named as defendants to the NSWSC proceedings, Cardinal 
Pell, the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney 
(“Trustees”), and Reverend Aidan Duggan (the parties named in the settlement 
deed earlier presented to Ellis). Ellis brought the claims against the defendants 
in tort and sought equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty.45
Due to the long delay since Duggan’s abuse of Ellis, Patten AJ had to 
determine whether Ellis could commence the proceedings. Ellis had to persuade 
Patten AJ that there were reasonable grounds for his Honour to believe that, 
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despite the delay since the damage Ellis alleged that he had suffered, the defen-
dants could have a fair trial.46 Additionally, Patten AJ had to adjudge whether 
Ellis had sued the correct defendants. The latter point was a critical one. Patten 
AJ would have allowed Ellis to sue the Trustees47 and to extend the limitation 
period for commencing the claims.48 Yet, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme 
Court of NSW (“Court of Appeal”) overturned Patten AJ’s decision to allow 
Ellis to extend the limitation period against the Trustees;49 the High Court of 
Australia (“High Court of Australia”) then rejected Ellis’ special leave applica-
tion appeal the decision.50 In the end, Ellis could sue no one.
In relation to the initial NSWSC proceedings, the Limitation Act 1961 (NSW) 
(“Limitation Act”) presumptively limited Ellis’ causes of action in tort against 
the defendants (Pell, the Trustees and Duggan) to six years from the date the 
cause of action first accrued to Ellis: section 14(1)(b). The Limitation Act also 
prevented the NSWSC from hearing the claims unless it could be satisfied that 
Ellis commenced proceedings within three years of Ellis first becoming aware 
of the connection between the personal injury he suffered and the defendants’ 
acts: section 60G and section 60I of the Limitation Act. Patten AJ decided that, 
based on the evidence presented to the NSWSC, the limitation period ended 
on 14 March 1985 (six years from 1979).51 Ellis filed his claims in 2004, 19 years 
after the expiry of the limitation period. It followed that, unless the NSWSC 
could be satisfied that there were good legal grounds to extend the limitation 
period by a very lengthy time, and that the defendants could have a fair trial, 
the NSWSC could not hear the claims. There also remained a significant legal 
hurdle to Ellis being able to bring the action against the Trustees, who appeared 
to have neither any decision-making authority for the Church nor any oversight 
of any priests in the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese.
The pretrial litigation was a barrister-guided excursion into the past abuses 
of Ellis, who later said that he found cross examination about the truth of his 
allegations particularly distressing because he had understood until that time 
that Catholic Church officials had believed his account.52 At no time did the 
Sydney Catholic Archdiocese in the litigation concede that Duggan committed 
the assaults on Ellis; it disputed elements of Ellis’ story, and asked him ques-
tions that may have caused him embarrassment. For example, Ellis was asked 
in cross examination about how Duggan came to officiate at Ellis’ wedding if 
Duggan’s advances were actually unwelcome, and whether, as a teenage boy, 
Ellis had any homosexual relationships before meeting Duggan.53
45
Ellis: a post Royal Commission analysis
A subtlety lost in the searing witness interrogation of Ellis, is that it took 
decades for Ellis to apprehend that Duggan’s paedophile acts amounted to abuse. 
Ellis had a delayed realisation. According to Patten AJ, as Ellis’ appreciation of 
the effects of the abuse on him dawned and then deepened, Ellis’ condition—his 
interpersonal skills; his mental health—worsened. Ellis would tell the NSWSC 
that it was in 2001 (when he was 40) during professional counselling, that he 
became aware of the extent that Duggan’s assaults on him affected Ellis’ rela-
tionship with his second wife.
The evidence before the NSWSC showed that Ellis came to know of the 
effects of Duggan’s assaults on him in early August 2001,54 a little more than 
three years before he filed the claims before the NSWSC, but more than 25 
years after Duggan’s first assaults. There was unchallenged evidence before the 
NSWSC that, by the age of 40, Ellis could not bring himself to utter Duggan’s 
name, convulsing at the prospect. His psychotherapist reported the follow-
ing in relation to counselling sessions he held with Ellis during August and 
September 2001:
In my 4th session with John, something turned up that was a 
complete surprise. After being able to talk quite freely about 
himself and what had happened to him up until then, he was 
unable to talk about something that the very thought of brought 
about the most significant physical change in John. He was able 
to speak of the fact of sexual abuse by a priest when he was a 
teenager, but unable to talk about or speak the priest’s name.55
Ellis was, however, the subject of gruelling interrogation about when 
he should have brought proceedings based on when he became aware of the 
significance to himself of Duggan’s assaults. Ellis, it was claimed, should have 
known of the damage he had suffered in August 2001 at the very latest;56 the 
technical legal dilemma was that Ellis appeared to have failed to make a claim 
within three years of that time (the implied professional insult was that, as a 
lawyer, he should have known better than to wait). The jibe overlooked the 
fact that Ellis was sexually assaulted as a boy. In what became an abstracted 
adversarial inquiry into the truth of Ellis’ account, there was no recorded chal-
lenge to Ellis’ testimony that he first became aware of Duggan’s sexual assaults 
in 1996 or 1997 when Ellis was in his mid-30s. To appreciate the significance 
of this point, it is worth pausing to dwell on it. It was not until 20 years after 
Duggan’s assaults that Ellis first apprehended that, when he was a teenage boy, 
he experienced sexual abuse.
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As noted, the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese’s lawyers proposed in 
cross examination of Ellis, that Ellis should have known, as a “well-qualified 
lawyer”,57 to bring the claims at the latest by early August 2004. There was little 
acknowledgement that, before he proceeded with his legal claims, Ellis spent 
two years trying to resolve his concerns privately through the Sydney Catholic 
Archdiocese’s program, Towards Healing. Nor was it conceded in cross exami-
nation that Ellis was by that time a well-qualified former lawyer, with his career 
with Baker & McKenzie finished. Ellis had resigned from Baker & McKenzie 
on 31 May 2004 after he realised that he could not at that stage continue full 
time work. He understandably attributed his departure from the firm to the 
effects of Duggan’s abuse.58
Patten AJ in the NSWSC concluded that Ellis did file the claims within 
three years of Ellis becoming aware of the nature and extent of the personal 
injury to himself resulting from Duggan’s assaults. His Honour held that Ellis 
did not become aware of the nature and extent of that injury until September 
2001.59 The judge also held that it was arguable that Ellis could sue the Trustees.60 
His Honour ordered an extension of time until 30 August 200461 (the same day 
Ellis filed the claims) for Ellis to bring the claims against the Trustees. Patten 
AJ also concluded that, despite the delay since the assaults, there could be a 
fair trial, albeit not a perfect one.62 Patten AJ dismissed Ellis’ application to 
grant the extension of time against Cardinal Pell and awarded costs against 
Ellis. He did not, however, specifically rule on whether Ellis had incorrectly 
joined Cardinal Pell as a defendant. The third defendant, Aidan Duggan, was 
dead and died destitute and Ellis did not press a claim against his estate. His 
Honour dismissed Ellis’ separate claim for equitable relief. Ellis could therefore, 
for now, have his case heard against the Trustees.
The Sydney Catholic Archdiocese appealed Patten AJ’s decision to extend 
the limitation period against the Trustees to the Court of Appeal. Ellis cross-
appealed the dismissal of Cardinal Pell’s liability. Before the Court of Appeal, the 
lawyers for Pell and the Trustees neither admitted nor denied the allegations of 
sexual abuse by Duggan. Instead, for the purpose of the ongoing interlocutory 
proceedings, Pell and the Trustees were only prepared to accept that there was 
an arguable case that Duggan had done what Ellis alleged he had done.63 There 
was no admission of liability in relation to Duggan’s predation; there was only 
an assumption made of there being an arguable case against him, conceded to 
the minimum possible extent.
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If the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese did admit to Duggan’s abuse, then Ellis 
could have taken some comfort that the Church (and the public) believed his 
account. The Church gave him no solace. There was no concession. There were 
at least three considerations suggesting that the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese 
could have conceded before the Court of Appeal (or before Patten AJ) that 
Duggan abused Ellis. Further, the Archdiocese could arguably have admitted 
to Duggan’s abuse without weakening its legal position in relation to the claims 
against Pell and the Trustees. Admitting to Duggan’s assaults did not per se 
make Cardinal Pell or the Trustees vicariously liable for Duggan’s actions or 
for damages. The issues of Duggan’s culpability, and the liability of Pell, the 
Trustees, and the Church were legally separable matters.
First, there was the compelling testimony by Ellis himself, and that of the 
independent experts who gave evidence about their professional observations 
of Ellis, describing the visceral effects of Duggan’s abuse on Ellis. The expert 
witnesses had little to gain from their professional testimony other than the value 
of having the NSWSC believe them to be credible about their observations of 
Ellis. Secondly, Monsignor Brian Rayner—appointed in 2003 as Vicar General 
and Chancellor of the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney, and Moderator of the 
Curia—did not ever doubt the truth of Ellis’ account and he communicated this 
to Cardinal Pell.64 Vicar General is a position of high standing in the Catholic 
Church and Rayner was the 1996 recipient of the Medal of the Order of Australia. 
He was a man of credibility in the Catholic Church, whose opinion, it might 
be thought, warranted more respect. Thirdly, during the proceedings before 
Patten AJ, another complainant—SA—came forward claiming that Duggan had 
sexually abused SA from April 1980 until the end of 1982 in the presbytery at St 
Mary’s Cathedral and at a holiday house.65 Pell later told the Royal Commission 
that he, and others he spoke with, believed that the evidence of SA significantly 
strengthened Ellis’ legal case, but neither he, nor anyone else in the Archdiocese, 
reconsidered their position on whether Duggan abused Ellis.66
As will be seen, Pell was of the view that the Church had to ensure that there 
could be no liability for the Trustees. Before the Court of Appeal, Cardinal Pell 
and the Trustees had a jarringly simple proposition: Ellis had sued the wrong 
defendants. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Church; its ruling was as unam-
biguous as it was unanimous. In Mason P’s leading Court of Appeal judgment, 
his Honour held that the proceedings were “ . . . doomed to fail and ought . . . 
to be dismissed as against the first and second defendants both as regards the 
claims in tort and the claim of breach of fiduciary duty.”67 According to Mason 
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P, the Church did not exist as a corporate body in law and the Trustees were not 
responsible for Duggan’s abuse. Cardinal Pell was not liable in perpetual succes-
sion for the actions and/or inactions of his predecessors. Mason P held that it 
was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to even consider the question of the 
application of the extension of time to sue the Trustees. In his Honour’s words, 
such an exercise was “ . . . pointless, [as] there is no viable cause of action”.68 Ipp 
JA and McColl JA each concurred with Mason P, without either judge writing 
a judgment. There was no clear guidance from the Court of Appeal about who 
the right defendant might be. Yet, Mason P observed that there was no allega-
tion against the Trustees as owners or occupiers of the Church buildings or 
presbytery.69 With this, Mason P hinted at a claim in occupier’s liability. Ellis’ 
lawyers had not raised a claim directly on the pleadings.
For John Ellis, the Court of Appeal’s decision meant that the evidence he 
had given before Patten AJ about his abuse at the hands of Duggan was legally 
irrelevant; it was, in Mason P’s words, “pointless”. Unless overturned by the High 
Court, the Court of Appeal’s decision created a precedent that could spell great 
difficulty not only for Ellis but for other victims of church abuse. Namely, a victim 
could not successfully bring an action against a church property trust even if 
the trust were the only defendant capable of financing a claim in damages for a 
priest’s paedophilia. Additionally, an Archbishop would not be vicariously liable 
for the past actions of a paedophile priest in their Archdiocese merely because 
the Archbishop took charge of the administration of the Archdiocese. What is 
more, the Church itself could not be liable for the actions of a paedophile priest. 
If the Church was not responsible for the actions of priests, then, logically, it 
would be less accountable for the actions of Church laity. The Church ought 
to have been concerned about the reverse implication of this finding. In what 
sense, could the Church take any credit for any charitable works of the laity? 
Finally, even with a weight of evidence pointing to a priest’s guilt and the priest 
himself being dead, the Church would admit nothing.
The Sydney Catholic Archdiocese was wary of the prospect of a suc-
cessful High Court challenge. The Church offered Ellis an immunity from the 
costs orders of the Court of Appeal (which the Church assessed as being in 
excess of $500,000) if Ellis did not apply to the High Court for special leave 
to appeal the decision led by Mason P.70 It later emerged that the Sydney 
Catholic Archdiocese incurred $755,940 in legal costs in the Ellis matter.71 The 
implications of the Church’s $500,000 immunity offer were twofold. First, the 
Archdiocese’s minimum legal costs in respect of the Ellis litigation exceeded 
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Ellis’s compensation request by at least five times. Secondly, if Ellis’ applica-
tion to the High Court did not succeed, then Ellis would be liable for at least 
$500,000 in legal costs, not including his own. These expenses would be even 
greater if the Church’s immunity offer did not reveal the full extent of its costs. 
Ellis nevertheless lodged an appeal to the High Court, believing that the Court 
of Appeal’s decision as it concerned the Trustees was wrong in law, and that 
other victims would be disadvantaged if the decision were not challenged.72 Yet, 
Ellis failed in his attempt to have the High Court grant his leave application. On 
16 November 2007, the High Court refused to grant Ellis leave to appeal.73 The 
High Court did not even hear verbal submissions from the Church’s lawyers. 
Ellis’ final avenue of legal appeal faltered without the case even going to a full 
hearing of the High Court. There was now no higher legal authority in Australian 
law than Mason P’s judgment in Ellis.
Unless addressed by legislation, the Court of Appeal’s decision would send 
several harsh messages to victims of child sexual abuse and their advisers. First, 
the victim would be responsible for explaining how much time had elapsed 
until they realised that they had suffered sexual abuse, and then understood 
its effects and consequences. The expectations on the claimant would be even 
higher if they were well educated. The obvious paradox was that, as a result 
of Ellis, there was no defendant against whom that same plaintiff could bring 
an effective claim. Secondly, and more prosaically, any victim, even a law firm 
partner, would struggle to win a court case against a well-resourced church. 
This was precisely the message that Pell intended to convey to victims. As the 
Royal Commission noted, “Cardinal Pell decided to accept the advice of the 
Church’s solicitors to vigorously defend the claim brought by Mr Ellis . . . to 
encourage other prospective plaintiffs not to litigate claims of child sexual abuse 
against the Church.”74
Thirdly, the Catholic Church would fight litigation. Fighting Ellis in Court 
was consistent with Pell’s intent. Cardinal Pell told the Royal Commission that he 
agreed with the advice of the Church’s lawyers that they, the lawyers, should not 
help Mr Ellis identify a suitable defendant;75 Pell also accepted the advice of the 
Church’s lawyers to refuse an offer by Ellis to mediate after Patten AJ’s decision 
in February 2006.76 Strikingly, Pell testified to the Royal Commission that “the 
principle that the Trustees were not liable had to be maintained ‘whatever we 
did’”.77 Pell saw Ellis as a high-stakes legal battle. The Archdiocese may have 
feared a “floodgates effect” if Ellis succeeded. Perhaps, too, there was a whiff 
of Pell’s personal ambition in the Ellis litigation. Pell had established himself 
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as the guard in chief of the Melbourne Catholic Archdiocese’s assets under the 
Melbourne Response. In 2014, he would be appointed as the first prefect of the 
Secretariat for the Economy in Rome, to be responsible for the budget of the 
Holy See and the Vatican. It is possible that Pell’s “whatever we did” approach in 
relation to the Ellis litigation was part of the Cardinal’s own groundwork for his 
role as Church financial protector. As the man who dispensed low compensa-
tion claims in the Melbourne Archdiocese and who, in Sydney, sought to save 
the Church from a potential breaking dam of victims’ claims, Pell could be a 
fitting candidate for managing the finances of the Catholic Church in Rome.
Fourthly, filing a complaint under Towards Healing would be a difficult, 
cumbersome, process without a guarantee of any satisfactory assistance for a 
victim (or compensation: capped or otherwise), and it would be adversarial.78 
Fifthly, the prospect that many victims of abuse may fear from litigation—a 
public and humiliating airing of the intimate details of their abuse—could not 
only occur, but even if it did occur, it may be “pointless”.79 Sixthly, the Sydney 
Catholic Archdiocese (and other churches or other institutions with children 
in their care) would have few financial incentives to expose or expunge abusers: 
so long as they structured their financial affairs in property trusts and ensured 
that those trusts were not involved in decision-making, the Church could not 
be financially liable to victims for abuse by priests. Conversely, other churches 
could alter their finance portfolios, and insulate their liability, by placing assets 
in property trusts. If the Church trusts were not involved in supervising priests 
or in diocesan management, then the trusts could not be a suitable defendant 
in relation to a victim’s legal claim of damages for paedophilia.
A seventh, more subtle, message was that those in charge of an Archdiocese 
had limited responsibility to scrutinise the antecedents of priests or to listen to 
information about them. By not admitting to Duggan’s abuse, the Sydney Catholic 
Archdiocese possibly avoided, in the short term, some public opprobrium. It 
was not obvious that the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese carried out rudimentary 
inquiries into Duggan’s background before entrusting him with caring for a bright 
teenage altar boy at Bass Hill. It is conceivable that no Catholic leader in Sydney 
(including Pell), knew of Aidan Duggan’s alleged predation at Fort Augustus 
before his return. Yet, the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese could seemingly produce 
no adequate records about Duggan. In 2004, the Archdiocese was incapable of 
disgorging any documentation about the priests at the Bass Hill parish between 
1976 and 1978 (three years in which Duggan sexually abused Ellis).80 It could not 
produce any records relating to Duggan’s time at New Norcia.81 The information 
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it held about Duggan’s 20 years at Fort Augustus before welcoming him back 
to Sydney consisted entirely of Duggan’s correspondence.82
Legislative recommendations
Only legislative reform could reverse Ellis and its implications. Yet, it was not 
until five years after the High Court dismissed Ellis’ special leave application that 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced the Royal Commission. Prime Minister 
Gillard announced the establishment of the Royal Commission into institutional 
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse on 12 November 2012. This announcement 
followed years of advocacy by, and for, survivors of child sexual abuse.83 It was 
fitting that Australia’s first female Prime Minister should announce the Royal 
Commission given that it can be argued that institutional abuse is predominantly 
an issue about male power.84 The Royal Commission received evidence about 
Ellis including from John Ellis and Cardinal Pell. After nearly five years, the Royal 
Commission released its final findings on 15 December 2017 in a 17-volume 
Final Report it supplied to the Governor General. It published a Case Study (No 
8) devoted to Ellis and his experiences with the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese.
The Royal Commission considered the importance of a redress scheme 
for victims of sexual abuse so pressing that in September 2015 (more than two 
years before the Royal Commission’s inquiry concluded) it released a Redress 
and Litigation Report. The Royal Commission recognised the importance of 
the government creating avenues for victims of sexual misconduct to obtain 
appropriate redress.85 It also highlighted the advantages of a national scheme 
as compared to individual state and territory schemes (or programs run by 
non-government institutions) while apprehending the difficulties, and the time 
required, for negotiations to take place in the Australian federation. On 31 May 
2018, the Catholic Church became the first major non-government institution 
to announce its intention to join the scheme. 86
The Royal Commission made two recommendations to address the anomalies 
arising from Ellis. First, the Royal Commission advised that state and territory 
governments should introduce legislation to ensure that, in cases of child sexual 
abuse, institutions must nominate a proper defendant with sufficient assets to 
meet a claim in damages or face the prospect of the property trust being the 
proper defendant and funding a claim in damages.87 Secondly, it recommended 
that state and territory governments remove limitation periods in the case of 
child sexual abuse in an institutional context, with retrospective effect.88
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JCB v Bird
The 2019 decision of JCB v Bird89 before the Supreme Court of Victoria is the 
first case the author is aware of where a Court interpreted legislation enacted in 
response to the Royal Commission’s recommendations about Ellis. McDonald 
J’s decision in JCB v Bird deals with the specific question of whether the Legal 
Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 (Vic) (“Child 
Abuse Act”) allows a plaintiff to add defendants to a claim if the plaintiff began 
the legal proceedings before the commencement of the Child Abuse Act.
JCB v Bird involves sexual abuse in the Ballarat Diocese by the previously 
mentioned Gerald Ridsdale. He sexually abused at least 50 victims in the Diocese 
between the late 1950s and the early 1990s.90 His convictions included sexual 
assaults in the Ballarat East, Swan Hill, Warrnambool, Apollo Bay, Inglewood, 
Edenhope, and Mortlake parishes.91 The majority of Ridsdale’s victims were 
under the age of 13; most were boys, there were also girls.92 Faced with allegations 
about his predations, the Ballarat Catholic Diocese typically moved Ridsdale 
to a different parish. Ridsdale, as a result, held 16 different appointments over 
a period of 29 years as a priest, with each appointment being on average less 
than two years.93
The case raises some similar issues to Ellis. First, JCB commenced pro-
ceedings long after the abuse took place (in JCB’s case, 36 years) Secondly, JCB 
sought to identify a Church defendant who could fund a successful claim in 
damages and the Church’s lawyers challenged whether JCB could sue such a 
defendant. Thirdly, while Ellis involved a legal question about the applicability 
of a statutory time limit, in JCB v Bird, similarly, the Church’s lawyers argued 
that the Child Abuse Act did not have any retrospective effect in relation to an 
already-commenced claim. Fourthly, in JCB v Bird, McDonald J considered a 
claim of occupier’s liability, which Mason P alluded to in his Honour’s Court 
of Appeal judgment in Ellis. However, a key difference in the cases was that, 
in Ellis, the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese did not admit to Duggan’s abuse of 
Ellis and it denied all liability in relation to Cardinal Pell and the Trustees. By 
contrast, in JCB v Bird, the Church’s lawyers admitted that Ridsdale sexually 
abused the plaintiff but the Church denied liability for the abuse. The victim’s 
lawyers noted that this was the first occasion in Australia that a Catholic Diocese 
had admitted liability for child sexual abuse and it was the first time in Victoria 
that the Catholic Church had made such an admission in a legal proceeding.94
JCB commenced the proceedings in the VSC on 20 February 2018, before 
the Child Abuse Act commenced; it came into effect on 1 July 2018. JCB alleged 
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that Ridsdale anally raped JCB in April 1982, when JCB was nine years old.95 
At the time of the assault on JCB, Ridsdale was the priest at St Colman’s Parish, 
Mortlake in the Ballarat Diocese. In March 2019, JCB sought to amend his 
statement of claim to include material to address the question of the defendants’ 
liability, as well as adding the Catholic Diocese of Ballarat as the third defen-
dant, and the Roman Catholic Trust Corporation for the Diocese of Ballarat as 
the fourth defendant. The defendants’ lawyers admitted that Ridsdale sexually 
abused the plaintiff but they denied liability for Ridsdale’s abuse of JCB.96 They 
also challenged whether JCB could add the third and fourth defendants.97
The Ballarat Diocese’s lawyers had a simple proposition in opposing JCB’s 
addition of the third and fourth defendants: they asserted that there was no clear 
indication in the Child Abuse Act that it was intended to operate retrospectively.98 
The primary issue for McDonald to determine was, therefore, whether the Child 
Abuse Act allowed JCB to add the two new defendants to JCB’s original claim. 
After a careful review of the Child Abuse Act, McDonald J rejected the defendants’ 
submissions that his Honour had no power to amend the proceeding to join 
the Diocese as a defendant in reliance upon the provisions of the Act because 
the proceeding against the defendants was commenced prior to 1 July 2018.99 
JCB could therefore add the two defendants. His Honour noted that, under the 
Child Abuse Act, the defendants had 120 days from the commencement of the 
claim against the Diocese (a non-government organisation (“NGO”) under the 
legislation) to nominate a proper defendant or, failing that, the plaintiff ’s claim 
could proceed against the trustees of an associated trust of the defendant.100 
His Honour held, for completeness, that under the Child Abuse Act, the 120 
day period was enlivened by the bringing of the claim against the NGO and 
not the commencement of the proceedings in which a claim is made against 
the NGO.101 This meant that the trial could not proceed for at least 120 days.
JCB sued Bishop Paul Bird, as Catholic Archbishop of the Diocese of 
Ballarat, on behalf of the estates of two deceased Ballarat Diocese Bishops each 
of whom had led the Ballarat Diocese at the time of Ridsdale’s assaults. The first 
Bishop was James O’Collins, Bishop of Ballarat between 1941 and 1971, who died 
in 1983. The second Bishop was Ronald Mulkearns who was coadjutor for the 
Ballarat Diocese between 1968 and 1971 and Bishop for the Diocese between 
1971 and 1997, and died in 2016. There was little doubt that the Bishops were 
negligent in their management of Ridsdale. The Royal Commission concluded 
that Mulkearns should not have appointed Ridsdale parish priest of Mortlake 
(where Ridsdale raped JCB) given what he already knew of Ridsdale’s history.102 
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The Truth Justice Healing Council (TJHC) conceded that Mulkearns’ actions 
were “inexcusably wrong”.103 Pell acknowledged before the Victoria Parliamentary 
Inquiry (in 2013) that Mulkearns placed paedophile clergy above the law.104 The 
Royal Commission noted that, after being made aware of a complaint of abuse 
by Ridsdale at North Ballarat in 1962, O’Collins moved Ridsdale to Mildura.105 
The Royal Commission accepted the evidence of Gerald Ridsdale that O’Collins 
placed no condition, restriction, or any supervision on Ridsdale’s move from 
North Ballarat to Mildura.106 Ridsdale proceeded to abuse children at Mildura.107
The Royal Commission concluded more broadly that there was an “extraor-
dinary failure within the [Ballarat] Diocese at the time to respond adequately to 
allegations and complaints about the sexual abuse of children by clergy over the 
course of at least three decades.”108 Similarly, the TJHC recognised that “such 
failures of leadership and communication . . . were and are unacceptable, and 
[that the failures] contributed to further abuse . . . after enough was known or 
suspected for that to have been prevented.”109 The TJHC observed that author-
ity to take any action in response to allegations of child sexual abuse lay solely 
with the bishop.110
What followed McDonald’s careful analysis of the legislation, was a razor-
edged review by his Honour of the defendants’ nonacceptance or denials of 
JCB’s allegations in relation to Ridsdale and the Ballarat Bishops. In their sub-
missions to the VSC, JCB’s lawyers particularised details of O’Collins having 
been informed in 1963 of an allegation that Ridsdale engaged in inappropriate 
behaviour of a sexual nature with a minor while he was a priest at the Ballarat 
North Parish.111 The Church’s defence included a denial of this allegation.112 
Similarly, JCB’s lawyers’ statements of claim described Mulkearns as having been 
aware, or having been made aware, prior to Ridsdale’s placement at St Colmans 
(Mortlake), of Ridsdale’s predilection or propensity to engage in inappropriate 
sexual conduct with minors.113 The defendants accepted that Mulkearns was 
informed of a complaint at Inglewood but it otherwise denied the allegation.114
The difficulty for the defendants was that their denials were inconsistent 
with TJHC submissions to the Royal Commission. For completeness, counsel 
for the plaintiffs confirmed from the bar table, without objection, that the TJHC 
submissions included the Diocese of Ballarat.115 McDonald J noted—tellingly—
that he drew no conclusion from the inconsistencies other than to observe that 
the TJHC submission appeared to go beyond the defendants’ limited admis-
sions and denials.116 His Honour was satisfied that O’Collins knew between 
1962 and 1964 of Ridsdale molesting a minor and that Mulkearns knew, prior 
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to Ridsdale’s appointment at Mortlake in 1981–82, that Ridsdale was engaging 
in inappropriate sexual behaviour with minors.117
McDonald J pressed even further with his Honour’s careful review of the 
defendants’ other nonacceptances or denials. The lawyers for the defendants 
did not admit that Ridsdale was engaged in priestly duties and responsibilities 
between July 1961 and November 1993 and they did not admit that, by reason 
of his position and status as a priest, Ridsdale was imbued with special author-
ity, power, control, and influence over members of the community.118 On 
these points, his Honour referred the defendants to section 42(1A) of the Civil 
Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (“Civil Procedure Act”).119 This section provides that, 
in a civil proceeding, a legal practitioner making a proper basis certification 
must ensure that there is a proper basis for each denial and non-admission in a 
defence. His Honour queried by reference to this section of the Civil Procedure 
Act, whether there was any proper basis for these denials.120
Concerning the non-admissions and denials, McDonald J adjudged that 
he would allow the parties time to address whether there had been a breach 
of the defendants’ obligations and/or that of their lawyers, under the relevant 
provisions of the Civil Procedures Act.121 The defendants could, to put the 
matter differently, reconsider the inconsistencies between the non-admissions 
in the defence materials with the TJHC submissions and reflect on whether it 
was plausible for them to deny that Ridsdale at the time was engaged in priestly 
duties, and imbued with special authority and influence over members of the 
community. McDonald J noted—ominously—that, if his Honour were satisfied 
that there was a breach of the defendants’ obligations under the Civil Procedures 
Act, then it would be necessary for his Honour to consider the making of orders 
against the defendants and/or their legal representatives.122 It is not surprising 
that the matter settled.123
McDonald J, however, had not finished with his Honour’s analysis of 
elements of the plaintiff ’s claim. JCB raised a claim of breach of occupier’s 
liability in relation to the fourth defendant. Specifically, JCB’s lawyers alleged 
that the fourth defendant failed to take reasonable care to ensure that JCB was 
not injured on the Church’s premises by reason of the state of the premises or 
of things done or omitted to be done in relation to the state of the premises.124 
JCB’s plea drew on the language of section 14B(3) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), 
which provides that “an occupier of premises owes a duty to take such care as 
in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that any person on the 
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premises will not be injured or damaged by reason of the state of the premises 
or things done or omitted to be done in relation to the state of the premises”.125
JCB’s lawyers contended that the “state of the premises” referred not only 
to the physical condition of the premises but to the condition of the premises 
while Ridsdale was present. While McDonald J considered JCB’s argument a 
novel one, his Honour was satisfied that there was an arguable case that the 
“state of the premises” could be interpreted this way.126 His Honour cited a 
decision of the Australian Capital Territory (“ACT”) Supreme Court in Hartigan 
v Commissioner for Social Housing in the Australian Capital Territory,127 where 
Penfold J, in reviewing similar legislation in the ACT, noted that “state of the 
premises” might refer to a property with dangerous guard dogs in it. McDonald 
J concluded, dryly, that Ridsdale’s presence on Church property might be con-
sidered analogous to the presence of a dangerous dog.128
Conclusion
The powerful work of the Royal Commission, and the legislative change that 
followed it, should not be allowed to mask more than a decade of legislative 
stasis after Ellis. The Ellis decision confirmed that victims of Church sexual abuse 
had no access to adequate compensation through the Courts. These were, and 
are, crimes involving gross power imbalances, with men using spiritual author-
ity and community standing for their own sexual gratification with children. 
While the decision may be legally impeccable, Ellis was a harsh decision for 
the victims of paedophilia who might otherwise be inclined to seek damages 
from the Catholic Church in the Australian courts.
It is difficult to estimate how many child victims of institutional abuse 
may have decided to not pursue compensation through the Courts as a result 
of Ellis. Similarly, it is impossible to know how many victims’ lawyers advised 
their clients that it would be too hard for their clients to pursue claims against 
the Catholic Church (or other institutions) due to Ellis. The political reaction 
to Ellis should have been immediate, decisive, and comprehensive, but there 
was, despite the lobbying of victims’ advocates and the painstaking work of the 
Royal Commission, an aching legislative silence.
The Australian states and territories enacted legislation to address Ellis 
after the conclusion of the five-year Royal Commission to make it impossible 
for a religious institution to rely on their structure through invocation of 
Ellis to escape liability for sexual or physical abuse of children.129 Even that 
legislation was slow to negotiate and to implement, as might be expected in a 
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constitutional federation. Despite the legislative changes, not all victims will 
be able to establish that a religious institution or a school is liable for historical 
child sexual abuse that they suffered. The 2019 decision of the Court of Appeal 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in The Council of Trinity Grammar 
School v Anderson130 illustrates this point. The victim in Trinity commenced 
legal proceedings in 2016 in relation to allegations of child sexual abuse in the 
1970s. The school (Trinity) sought an order that the proceedings be stayed. In 
2018, Rothman J in the Supreme Court of NSW dismissed the school’s appli-
cation. In 2019, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against Rothman J’s 
decision and granted the school a permanent stay of proceedings. The Court 
of Appeal reasoned that, because of the passing of time, the unavailability of 
witnesses, and the absence of documentation concerning the attendance of 
pupils at camps, Trinity was unable to meaningfully deal with the question of 
whether it had placed the alleged perpetrator of abuse in a position of power 
and intimacy which gave the occasion for the wrongful acts.131 The Court of 
Appeal noted—crucially—that the prejudice to Trinity from the delay was not 
due to the school’s own neglect.132 The reader might wish to consider Ellis 
through this lens.
It is instructive to reflect on how Ellis became binding and precedent in 
Australian law. The case became a precedent for two closely related reasons. 
First, the manifest failures in the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese’s administration 
of Towards Healing in relation to John Ellis, that led to the pretrial litigation 
and to the Court of Appeal’s decisive judgment. Ellis did not pursue resolution 
through the Courts except as a last resort. Ellis’ Towards Healing claim was a 
plea for the Church’s emotional and spiritual support. If the Sydney Catholic 
Archdiocese had a properly-administered healing program that provided victims 
with fair compensation, then Ellis need never have been decided. Secondly, the 
approach the Sydney Catholic Archdiocese took in relation to Ellis, namely, that 
it was more important to protect the Church’s financial assets, than it was to 
allow John Ellis, or any other victim of Church abuse, to gain access to com-
pensation through the Courts. Once the pretrial litigation began, the Sydney 
Catholic Archdiocese was exposed to the possibility of paying fair compensa-
tion. Cardinal Pell saw Ellis as “must win” for the Church, for reasons only he 
can know. And, legally, he won.
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